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Should the $1 bill be




s N INSIDIOUS CONSEQUENCE of the decline in the dollar’s
purchasing power over the past hundred years is the mis-
match between the denominations of circulating currency
and the transactions in which this currency is used. One 
subtle manifestation of this is the evolution of “penny trays”
at many retail establishments, where customers are invited to
“take or leave a penny.” Another is the fact that many people rarely
bother to stoop to pick up a penny lying on the ground. It has 
become increasingly difficult to carry enough coins to use pay
phones for long-distance phone calls. And the New York City 
Transit Authority estimates that more than half of the riders on the
express buses from Staten Island to Manhattan carry rolls of quarters
to pay the $4 fare because the buses don’t accept dollar bills.
It is not just in the form of greater inconvenience that this mis-
match manifests itself. For example, the Southern California Transit
District sells crumpled dollar bills for 97 cents to a subcontractor who
unwrinkles them by hand.
1 The Chicago Transit Authority estimates
that it costs $22 per thousand to sort notes, versus $1.64 per thou-
sand to sort coins. The source of this dissonance is the low purchas-
ing power of the lowest denomination circulating note in the United
States (the $1 bill) and the highest denomination circulating coin (the
quarter). Low-value transactions that were once the exclusive domain
A
THEECONOMICSOFONEDOLLARof the quarter now typically require the
use of a $1 coin or note. In transactions
for which only a coin can be used, the
absence of a widely held $1 coin sub-
jects the public to unnecessary costs
and inconvenience. When a note can
be used, the high volume of low-value
transactions means that it is subject to a
lot more wear and tear. It may be time
to think about replacing the $1 bill with
a $1 coin.
In recent years, there has been 
renewed interest on the part of the gov-
ernment in just such a move. For exam-
ple, as part of a proposal for balancing
the federal budget it has been sug-
gested that the $1 bill be replaced by a
$1 coin, on the grounds that such a
switch could yield substantial savings.
2
According to some estimates, the switch
could save taxpayers as much as $500
million annually. More recently, the
Clinton administration has reportedly
been considering the introduction of a
new $1 coin as the existing stock of
Susan B. Anthony dollars held by the
Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks is
issued into circulation.
However, the very existence of the
large stock of Anthony dollars in the
Fed’s vaults serves as a reminder that,
less than 20 years ago, a similar attempt
to replace the $1 bill with a $1 coin
failed miserably. The Susan B. Anthony
coin was introduced in 1979, with the
intention that it would ultimately re-
place the $1 bill. But the Anthony dol-
lar was never widely accepted by the
public, with the result that production
of the coin ceased less than a year after
its introduction. The public’s unwilling-
ness to use the Anthony dollar leads
many commentators to argue that a re-
newed attempt to get Americans to ac-
cept $1 coins in place of $1 bills would
also be doomed to failure. Opponents
of the $1 coin contend that if the Amer-
ican public would benefit from the in-
troduction of a $1 coin, it would have
eagerly embraced the Anthony dollar.
Despite the failure of the Anthony
dollar, there are substantial benefits to
be had from replacing the $1 bill with a
$1 coin. A properly managed plan to re-
place the $1 bill with a $1 coin could be
just as successful as similar conversions
in Canada, Australia and the U.K. over
the past 15 years.
The Composition of the 
Stock of U.S. Currency
As of March 31, 1996, $416,280,682,432
of U.S. currency was in circulation 
outside of the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Banks. That’s $1,573.15 for
every man, woman and child in the
country, a surprisingly large number
and one that raises questions about
who holds the outstanding stock of 
dollars. About 95 percent of the total
stock of currency outstanding (by
value) consists of banknotes, almost all
of which are Federal Reserve notes.
Table 1 gives a denominational
breakdown of the outstanding stock of
Federal Reserve notes, as well as each
denomination’s share in the total by
value and by volume. Note that very
high denomination notes (above $100)
account for a trivial fraction of the stock
of paper currency outstanding: very high
denomination notes have not been
printed since 1945 and have not been
issued since 1969.
3 The table shows that
the $1 bill looms large in the stock of
U.S. currency: more than one-third of
the bills outstanding are $1 bills, with
the next most common denominations
being the $20 bill and the $100 bill. But
although $1 bills are important in terms
of their sheer number, they account 
for a relatively small percentage of 
the value of the stock of currency out-
standing. While high denomination
notes ($50 and $100) account for just
under one-fifth of the stock outstanding 
by volume, in value terms these de-
nominations account for almost three-
quarters of the outstanding stock.
4
The need to maintain such a large
stock of $1 bills in circulation makes 
the provision of currency unnecessarily
costly to the monetary authority, and
thus ultimately to taxpayers. The aver-
age lifetime of a $1 bill is about a year
and a half: replacing worn-out $1 bills is
a net drain on government revenue,
and insofar as a $1 coin would have a
longer lifetime (30 years is the standard
estimate), the government (and thus 
the taxpayer) could realize significant
savings from replacing the $1 bill with a
$1 coin. The Bureau of Engraving and
Printing (BEP), which produces all U.S.
paper currency, devotes about 95 per-
cent of its annual production capacity to
replacing worn-out notes of various de-
nominations. Most of this replacement
production is devoted to replacing $1
bills, since they account for such a large
fraction of the outstanding stock of bills
and have by far the shortest lifetime of
any of the bills. Specifically, about 45
percent of production time is devoted
to the $1 bill, as opposed to 5 percent
for the $50 and $100 bills.
The Coin–Note Boundary
Because coins are more expensive to
produce, any decision to replace the 
$1 bill with a $1 coin would have to
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Table 1
Paper currency outstanding by denomination, March 31, 1996
Percent of Percent of
Denomination Total total volume total value
$ 1 $ 5,897,666,092 34.0 1.5
2 917,235,364 3.0 .2
5 6,996,954,260 8.5 1.8
10 13,255,581,890 8.1 3.4
20 80,081,015,360 24.4 20.4
50 47,767,891,950 5.8 12.2
100 237,657,651,300 14.5 60.5
500 144,771,500 0 0
1,000 168,025,000 0 0
5,000 1,715,000 0 0
10,000 3,350,000 0 0
Total $392,891,857,716 100 100
SOURCE: Treasury Bulletin, June 1996, Table USCC-2.a $1 coin would yield about $600 mil-
lion in net annual savings to the private
sector, which he defines as including
state and local government operators of
mass transit systems.
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Why Did the 
Susan B. Anthony Dollar “Fail”?
The Susan B. Anthony coin’s failure
to gain widespread acceptance raises
the question of whether another attempt
to replace the $1 bill with a $1 coin
would meet the same fate. The reason
usually given for the failure of the 
Anthony dollar is that it too closely re-
sembled a quarter. It is difficult to know
how much weight we should give to
this argument: the Anthony dollar
weighs about 43 percent more than the
quarter (8.1 grams versus 5.67 grams)
and bears almost the same size relation-
ship to the quarter as the quarter bears
to the nickel.
8 Furthermore, one never
hears such complaints about U.S. paper
currency, even though all denomina-
tions of U.S. paper currency are exactly
the same size and color.
9
While design features may have
played some role in the Anthony dol-
lar’s failure to gain widespread accep-
tance, one suspects that something
deeper was also at work. John Caskey
and Simon St. Laurent (1994) argue 
that it was the government’s failure to
appreciate the important role of net-
work externalities in a currency system
that doomed the Anthony dollar. A net-
work externality exists when the value
of a product to a consumer changes 
as the number of users of the product
changes. For example, a phone has 
little value if there’s no one to call. 
Likewise, the usefulness of a computer
increases when it can interact with a 
lot of other computers. Network exter-
nalities exist in currency systems also:
the value of currency to a consumer is
directly related to the number of other
consumers using the same currency. In
the presence of externalities, leaving in-
dividual consumers to pursue their own
interests does not always generate the
best outcome. Specifically, when indi-
viduals are given the choice between an
existing $1 bill and a new $1 coin, there
take these higher production costs into
account. The fact that the $1 bill is the
lowest denomination circulating note in
the United States, while the quarter is
the highest denomination circulating
coin, reflects a decision by the issuers
of U.S. currency about where to locate
the coin–note boundary in the denom-
inational structure of U.S. currency.
Coins and notes have competing merits
as currency. Typically, low denomina-
tion currency tends to be made of more
durable materials than high denomina-
tion currency. The reason is that while
it may cost more to produce a coin than
a note (about 8 cents for a dollar coin
versus 3.5 to 4 cents for a dollar bill),
the greater frequency of use of low de-
nomination currency means that it is
subject to much more wear and tear, and
so the greater durability of coins out-
weighs their higher cost of production.
The coin–note boundary is placed at
the denomination where the greater
durability of coins is less important than
the lower cost of production of notes.
At present, the coin–note boundary is
at the $1 denomination. The existing
coin–note boundary was essentially de-
termined during the Civil War, when the
U.S. government first got involved in
the production of paper currency.
5 The
$1 bill was first issued by the U.S. gov-
ernment during the Civil War; prior to
the issuance of a $1 bill by the federal
government, the demand for a currency
token at the $1 denomination was met
by the production of silver dollars and a
plethora of privately issued bank notes.
The optimal location of the coin–note
boundary will shift over time as the
value of the average transaction rises
and low denomination notes are used
more frequently. The $1 bill is used a
lot more frequently and is subject to a
lot more wear and tear in a world
where the average cup of coffee costs a
dollar and not a dime. The BEP has im-
proved the durability of the $1 bill so
that each bill now lasts an average of 18
months before deteriorating to the point
of being unfit for circulation. But the
need to replace a large and growing
stock of $1 bills is now such that it may
make more sense to replace the cheap
to produce but short-lived $1 bill with a
more expensive to produce but longer
lived $1 coin.
Both the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) and the Federal Reserve
estimate that replacing the $1 bill with a
$1 coin could save the federal govern-
ment as much as $400 million to $500
million annually; some private estimates
are even higher.
6 The exact magnitude
of the savings depends on a variety of
factors that are difficult to quantify 
precisely. One is the extent to which
the outstanding stock of $1 bills is 
replaced by a larger stock of $1 coins:
experience with note-to-coin conver-
sions in other countries suggests that
the public may demand a larger stock
of coins than notes of the same denom-
ination. Another is the extent to which
there is a corresponding decline in the
use of the quarter and an increase in the
use of the $2 bill; again, based on the
experience of other countries, both of
these outcomes are likely.
What About the Users of Currency?
Missing from these estimates of sav-
ings are the direct costs and benefits to
the private sector that the replacement
of the $1 bill with a $1 coin would pro-
duce. The costs would primarily involve
the conversion of existing vending 
machines, pay phones and so on to 
accept the new coin, but would also 
include increased transportation and
handling costs associated with the use
of a $1 coin. The savings would come
from reduced processing costs for tran-
sit authorities, the banking industry 
and operators of coin-operated vending
machines.
Would the savings to the govern-
ment be offset by higher costs to the
private-sector users of currency? George 
McCandless, Jr., (1991) estimates that
adding a slot to accept a new $1 coin to
an existing vending machine would
cost only $25 in parts and $50 in labor.
The costs of retrofitting existing parking
meters and laundry machines are of a
comparable order of magnitude. Coins
are much more expensive to transport
than are notes: $1,000 worth of Anthony
dollars weighs about 17 pounds, versus
three pounds for $1,000 worth of dollar
bills. However, even when these costs
are factored in, McCandless estimates
that the replacement of the $1 bill with
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  3is no guarantee that the coin will be
adopted, even if adoption would make
everyone better off.
Caskey and St. Laurent identify two
sources of network externalities associ-
ated with a currency system. The first
concerns the physical payments infra-
structure that develops around the 
collection of bills and coins that circu-
late as currency. The second concerns
the importance of familiarity with cur-
rency in facilitating transactions. Let’s
start with the physical payments infra-
structure, by which we mean vending
machines, cash registers, transit fare
boxes, highway tollbooths, parking 
meters, subway fare machines, pay
phones and so on. The various capital
goods that make up the physical pay-
ments infrastructure are typically cali-
brated to accept a limited range of 
the circulating coins and notes. For 
example, today many of these ma-
chines will accept only nickels, dimes
and quarters, even though the penny,
Kennedy half-dollar, and Anthony and
Eisenhower dollars are all legal tender.
The operators of these machines have
an incentive to recalibrate their machines
to accept a new type of coin (or a new
denomination of coin) only if they ex-
pect that a significant fraction of their
customers are going to use the new
coin. Likewise, customers who make
purchases from machines (whether they
be bus rides, phone calls or news-
papers) are going to be willing to adopt
a new coin only if they expect to be
able to use the new coin in a significant
fraction of these machines.
The second source of network exter-
nalities in a currency system arises from
the familiarity of individuals with the
most commonly encountered bills and
coins. Transactions are faster when both
parties are familiar with the bills and
coins that are offered in payment and
returned in change. Lest you doubt this,
try buying something with an Anthony
or Eisenhower dollar! When a new coin
is introduced, shoppers are going to
adopt it and familiarize themselves with
it only if they expect to be able to use
it easily in a wide range of transactions.
This in turn requires that a large per-
centage of other shoppers and retailers
also adopt the new coin. The existence
of these network externalities means
that the total benefit to the average in-
dividual of adopting a particular type 
of token for a particular currency de-
nomination will increase the greater the
fraction of the population that also
adopts that token.
Caskey and St. Laurent argue that it
was the failure of the U.S. government
to take into account these network ex-
ternalities that doomed the Anthony
dollar. Specifically, by not removing the
$1 bill from circulation at the same time
that the Anthony coin was introduced,
the government created uncertainty
about how widely the new coin would
be used. The public didn’t want to carry
a coin that they could only use in a 
limited number of retail transactions;
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A Theory of Why the Anthony Dollar Failed
Chart 1 illustrates why note-to-coin conversions generally fail if the public is given a
choice between using a note or a coin for a particular denomination. The vertical axis
measures the percentage of operators of the physical payments infrastructure (whom I
refer to as vending machine operators), V, who recalibrate their equipment to accept a
new coin. The horizontal axis measures the percentage of consumers who carry the new
coin, C. The curve V = V(C) shows the percentage of vending machine operators who re-
calibrate their equipment to accept the new coin as a function of the percentage of the
coin-carrying public that adopts the new coin. The curve C = C(V ) shows the percentage
of the coin-carrying public that adopts the new coin as a function of the fraction of the
stock of vending machines they expect will have been recalibrated to accept the new
coin. Both of these curves are upward sloping: as a larger fraction of the public chooses
to use the new coin, a larger fraction of the vending machine operators will recalibrate
their equipment to accept the new coin; as a larger fraction of vending machine opera-
tors recalibrate their equipment to accept the new coin, a larger fraction of the public will
carry the new coin.
Both curves are also 
S-shaped. If vending ma-
chine operators expect
only a small fraction of the
public to adopt the new
coin, it will not be in their
interest to recalibrate their
machines to accept it. As
the fraction of the public
that adopts the new coin
grows, more vending ma-
chine operators will recali-
brate, and the rate at
which they do so will in-
crease. Eventually, if every-
one is carrying the new
coin, all vending machine
operators will have ad-
justed their machines to accept the new token. We can apply an analogous argument to
motivate the shape of the C(V ) curve.
There are two possible outcomes: either everyone adopts the new coin, or no one
does. If not enough members of the public adopt the new coin initially, the no-use out-
come is the eventual result. If a large enough fraction of the public adopts the new coin
initially, it may be possible to get everyone to eventually do so. The critical percentages
are V * and C*, respectively. If fewer than V * of the vending machine operators adapt their
machines to accept the new coin initially, and fewer than C* of the public start carrying
the new coin, the new coin will ultimately fail to circulate. Experience seems to suggest
that when given a choice, most people adopt a wait-and-see attitude, with the result that
the new coin never gets into wide circulation. This is what happened when the Anthony
dollar was introduced. The only way to really encourage the public to adopt the new coin
is to simultaneously withdraw the competing bill. This is what other major countries that
have engineered note-to-coin conversions in recent years have done. Opinion polls in
Canada following the introduction of the C$1 coin to replace the C$1 bill showed that the








accept the new coin
Percentage of consumers
carrying the new coin
V*
C*
Chart 1vending machine operators were un-
willing to calibrate their machine to 
accept a coin that would rarely be 
offered in payment by their customers.
By contrast, the other major countries
that replaced low denomination notes
with coins in recent years (Australia,
Canada and the U.K.) always withdrew
the note from circulation when the new
coin was introduced. By doing so, the
public was sure that they would be able
to use the new coin in a large number
of transactions, and vending machine
operators calibrated their equipment to
accept the new coin because they were
sure that a significant fraction of the
public would be carrying it.
Conclusions
There are sound economic reasons
for replacing the $1 bill with a $1 coin.
The most fundamental is the erosion in
the purchasing power of the dollar that
has occurred over the past 130 years.
Low-value transactions that were once
the exclusive province of the quarter now
require either large numbers of quar-
ters, inconveniencing the public, or $1
bills, which need to be replaced regu-
larly, thus draining government revenues.
The unwillingness of the U.S. public
to use the Anthony dollar makes the
United States unique among developed
countries in terms of the low purchas-
ing power of its lowest denomination
circulating note and highest denomi-
nation circulating coin. Many other
countries have successfully replaced
their lowest denomination note with a
coin. Canada replaced the C$1 note
with a coin in 1987 and the C$2 note
with a coin in 1996. There is no good
economic reason why the United States
cannot also do the same. However, 
any decision to replace the $1 bill with
a coin would necessarily take into 
account a broader range of considera-
tions than those discussed here. Federal
Reserve Board Gov. Edward W. Kelley,
Jr., noted in testimony to Congress on
this issue that “...the significance of the
U.S. dollar goes beyond the purchasing
power it represents or the utility it 
provides; for Americans, the dollar is 
a symbol of economic and political 
stability and a source of national pride;
consequently, any change should be




1 New York Times Magazine, December 26, 1993, p. 9.
2 See Georges (1995).
3 Very high denomination notes were withdrawn from circulation to
make it more difficult to evade income tax by conducting business
transactions in cash.
4 The discrepancy between these numbers is intriguing and raises the
question of how much of the outstanding stock of paper currency is
really held within the United States, given that one rarely encounters
$50 or $100 bills in the course of legitimate everyday transactions.
Porter and Judson (1996) consider a variety of possibilities and
come down firmly in favor of the hypothesis that the bulk of the miss-
ing currency circulates overseas. They estimate that as of the end of
1991, about $200 billion (out of a total stock of currency in circula-
tion of $375 billion) was circulating overseas.
5 Before the Civil War, the only notes at the $1 denomination were pri-
vately produced, although the federal government did issue silver
dollars.
6 GAO (1990), Allison (1992), GAO (1993) and Kelley (1995).
7 These savings are in addition to the estimated savings to the gov-
ernment or public sector, which McCandless puts at between $860
million and $890 million annually.
8 The Susan B. Anthony dollar is 26.5 mm in diameter, the quarter is
24.26 mm in diameter, and the nickel is 21.21 mm in diameter.
9 Few people claim to have any difficulty distinguishing a $1 note from
a $10 note or a $100 note. Curiously, some have argued that one of
the reasons that the $2 note never gained wide acceptance was that
it was too easily confused with the $20 note! For some reason, no-
body has this problem with $5 and $50 bills.
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sUCH IS BEING made of the
apparently contradictory sig-
nals being sent by various
U.S. economic indicators. The
nation’s falling unemploy-
ment rate and rising industrial
capacity utilization rate would seem to
indicate inflationary pressures. But even
with the lowest unemployment rate in
decades, prices haven’t moved much,
and the producer price index has actu-
ally fallen this year (Chart 1).
A number of explanations have been
offered for the apparent contradiction
of an economy growing despite capac-
ity constraints and without inflation.
Many of these explanations involve 
domestic factors. For example, some
analysts argue that falling domestic
computer prices and increasing compu-
tational capacity explain at least some
of the decline in overall prices and 
increases in overall output. Similarly,
growth in the domestic labor force may
explain why the low unemployment
rate has not set off wage pressures that
led to price increases.
Some explanations for the contradic-
tion between what look like strains 
on U.S. productive capacity and the 
absence of substantive inflationary pres-
sure are international. One candidate
involves exchange rates. Chart 2 shows
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ 
real trade-weighted value of the dollar
index. This chart indicates that, after 
adjustments for differentials between 
inflation in the United States and its
trading partners, the purchasing power
of the dollar in 1997 has been markedly
higher than at any time during the
1990s. That a dollar buys more foreign
products now than a year ago might
mean that foreign competition is disci-
plining U.S. producers more now than a
year ago. Domestic producers that con-
sider raising prices risk losing market
share to foreign producers.
Another possible reason U.S. infla-
tion is low despite strains on domestic
capacity is that capacity utilization is 
relatively low in other developed coun-
tries. Consequently, increasing U.S. de-
mand can be easily shifted abroad
without putting upward pressure on im-
ported goods prices. Chart 3 offers a
perspective on this factor by showing
manufacturing capacity utilization rela-
tive to its 10-year average for each of 
six countries, including the United
States. Indexing capacity utilization to
its long-run average is important be-
cause differences in countries’ methods
for calculating capacity utilization make
cross-country comparisons misleading.
Chart 3 shows that capacity utili-
zation in most of the United States’ prin-
cipal trading partners is lower than 
their 10-year averages. With the excep-
tion of Canada, all the U.S. trading 
partners’ capacity utilization is below
their 10-year average. Not surprisingly,
considering the allegations that the
United States faces capacity constraints,
the U.S. capacity utilization is above its
10-year average.
Even if U.S. buyers do not purchase
products abroad, the availability of ex-
cess capacity in other countries creates
competitive pressures against price in-
creases in the United States. The oppor-
tunity for U.S. purchasers to buy abroad
from sellers with excess capacity im-
plies that, if U.S. producers raise prices,
they may not have domestic customers
for long. The very existence of larger
excess capacity can dampen upward
price pressures.
But despite the presence of this 
apparent safety valve for U.S. inflation,
there is reason to suspect that the pres-
sure release might have only a limited
life. Chart 3 shows, that in most coun-
tries with capacity utilization below
their long-run averages, the indexes are
edging up. While a continued strong
dollar may permit domestic price pres-
sures to be let off internationally, world
capacity constraints may catch up and
no longer serve as a release for domes-
tic demand.
—William C. Gruben
SWE SWE SWE Beyond the Border Beyond the Border
U.S. Inflation and the International Economy
M
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Chart 2
Real Trade-Weighted 
Value of the U.S. Dollar








’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash,
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page, www.dallasfed.org.
Index, January 1995 = 100 March–May 1997
Texas and U.S. Employment Growth
Quarter-over-quarter, annualized
Texas Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Employment Growth in Service-Producing Industries
Index, January 1995 = 100
Percent
Average weekly hours .17
Help-wanted index
Texas Stock Index
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
FTER CHUGGING ALONGSIDE the national economy
for almost 18 months, the Texas economy has picked
up steam and pulled away. Texas employment grew 
at an annual 3.7 percent in May, compared with 
national employment growth of 1.4 percent. Growth is
broad based across sectors in the Texas economy.
The construction industry was among the sectors showing
the strongest growth, with employment increasing at a 16 
percent annual rate in May. Nonresidential building activity is
strong and has been on an upward trend since the beginning
of the year, with contract values in May 9 percent higher than
a year earlier.
Although West Texas Intermediate crude prices fell to a 
16-month low in mid-June, the energy industry continues to be
vibrant. Improved technology is a major factor in the current
A
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
5/97 121.3 125.0 163.1 456.5 1,073.6 1,474.8 5,349.2 8,517.2 1,826.8 705.9
4/97 120.3 124.5 163.1 450.9 1,072.2 1,474.4 5,328.9 8,489.5 1,828.5 703.4
3/97 119.3 124.3 162.5 448.7 1,068.6 1,472.3 5,313.9 8,466.0 1,824.1 702.1
2/97 119.5 124.1 162.7 446.5 1,068.7 1,470.2 5,296.2 8,444.3 1,821.9 701.6
1/97 119.0 124.3 160.7 437.0 1,064.3 1,467.0 5,276.2 8,405.2 1,820.3 699.8
12/96 117.9 124.0 159.4 443.9 1,065.9 1,465.7 5,279.7 8,414.6 1,819.4 698.5
11/96 118.8 123.8 158.7 445.4 1,065.1 1,460.7 5,271.3 8,401.2 1,818.7 697.0
10/96 117.7 123.3 157.9 442.1 1,061.4 1,455.9 5,237.6 8,354.9 1,816.0 696.2
9/96 117.1 123.0 156.9 438.1 1,057.9 1,450.0 5,179.1 8,282.0 1,815.2 694.7
8/96 116.6 123.7 156.6 438.1 1,057.2 1,453.8 5,167.5 8,273.2 1,811.5 697.5
7/96 115.9 123.3 156.5 436.0 1,054.8 1,448.5 5,145.1 8,240.9 1,807.0 695.8
6/96 116.1 123.0 156.2 435.6 1,054.4 1,448.2 5,131.3 8,225.7 1,810.3 695.3
* in thousands.
strength, and the industry is profitable with lower oil prices.
The service sector also shows broad-based healthy growth.
Trade employment grew at a 3.2 percent annual rate in May,
and employment in finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE)
grew at an annualized 5.5 percent. The healthy construction
industry and continued relocations into the region are boost-
ing FIRE employment. Employment in business, legal, health
and engineering services continues to grow at a fast pace.
Wage pressures continue to increase in Texas. Labor mar-
kets are tight for both blue-collar and white-collar jobs. Higher
wages are reported in the energy and high-tech industries and
in business and legal services. Although the tight labor market
will keep a lid on employment growth, it doesn’t seem to
have slowed growth yet.
—Mine Yücel
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sThe Business of Education
Meeting the Demands of a Strong Economy Through Educational Change
Today’s schools are responsible for tomorrow’s economic growth and productivity. In fact, strong
economic growth and high employment levels require that we have a comprehensive and sound
educational system. Therefore, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is hosting a conference to
explore current educational conditions, the goals and standards of education, popular education
reform initiatives, funding issues and businesses’ stake in the outcome. Emphasis will also be
placed on the crucial and often interdependent roles and responsibilities of educators, parents,
businesses and policymakers in improving our educational environment.
October 16–17, 1997
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
$95 registration fee on or before September 30
$120 registration fee after October 1
Texas Gov. George W. Bush and U.S. Education Secretary 
Richard W. Riley have been invited to speak.
Conference speakers include:
James Adams, Texas Instruments Inc.; Robert Berdahl, University of California at Berkeley;
Lynne Cheney, American Enterprise Institute; Caroline Minter Hoxby, Harvard University; Lisa
Graham Keegan, Arizona Department of Education; Sandy Kress, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer &
Feld LLP; Myron Lieberman, Education Policy Institute; Tom Luce, Hughes & Luce LLP; Michael
Moses, Texas Commissioner of Education; Jill Shugart, Garland Independent School District; Lori
Taylor, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
SWE SWE SWE Upcoming Event Upcoming Event
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
p.o. box 655906
Dallas, Texas 75265-5906
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